General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court: Striking a Blow for Corporate Counsel by Lape, Rodd B.
General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court:
Striking a Blow for Corporate Counsel
RODD B. LAPE
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a loyal employee for a major national corporation. You
have been employed by the corporation for the past fifteen years and have been
rewarded for your hard work with numerous promotions and pay raises. You
have a nice house in the suburbs, a loving spouse, and two young children; you
are living the proverbial American dream. One day, you discover that certain
members of the corporation are engaging in (or are planning to engage in)
conduct that violates a state or federal law. Although you are under no legal or
professional duty to report this discovered illegal conduct, 1 your loyalty to the
corporation and your conscience lead you to notify your supervisor and
disclose the situation. One week later, you are summoned to the office of the
president of the corporation and are summarily fired. You are quite naturally
upset and your feelings of betrayal lead you to investigate the possible legal
options that may be available.
Most people would not be surprised to discover that, on the basis of these
hypothetical facts, many attorneys would be more than willing to represent this
fictional employee. In fact, the chances for some type of recovery in this
hypothetical case are most likely quite good. There is, however, one caveat to
this optimistic prediction of recovery: it must be assumed that the fictional
corporate employee is not an attorney. If the employee is also an attorney, the
chance for any recovery declines significantly, and, depending on the state in
which the legal action is brought, the chance for recovery may be nil. 2
This Note will analyze the recent decision of the California Supreme Court
in General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court.3 In this decision, the California
1 For the purposes of this hypothetical, I am making the assumption that this fictional
employee will not be violating any state or federal law by failing to report the discovered
conduct. In reality, it is quite possible that the employee would be potentially liable for any
harm caused by the unreported conduct under some conspiracy or accessory theory.
Furthermore, it is likely that this fictional employee, as a condition of continued
employment, would also be under some affirmative duty to report the discovered illegal
conduct to a superior within the corporation.
2 For a listing of relevant cases in the states that have decided this question, see
infra note 6.
3 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
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Supreme Court upheld the decision of Judge Joseph E. Johnston of the
Superior Court of San Bernardino County4 that allowed a discharged corporate
attorney to sue his former employer under the theory of wrongful discharge5
and breach of an implied contract. Part II of this Note will review the facts of
General Dynamics and summarize the reasoning and holding of the California
Supreme Court. Part M will provide a brief history of the employment at-will
doctrine and will examine how this general doctrine has been eroded in recent
years. Part IV will consist of an analysis of the General Dynamics decision,
focusing mainly on the public policy (wrongful discharge) theory of recovery.
The allowance of this theory of recovery is what sets apart the General
Dynamics decision from the handful of other discharge cases that have dealt
specifically with in-house attorneys. 6 In fact, of the cases that have allowed
4 General Dynamics Corp. v. Rose, No. RCV 059238 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1992),
aff'd sub nom. General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, No. E010883, 1993 WL
225346 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. June 8, 1993), aft'd, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
5 The term "wrongful discharge" is often used in conjunction with or in place of other
similar terms, most notably "retaliatory discharge," "tortious discharge," and "abusive
discharge." These terms will be used interchangeably throughout this Note and are meant to
denominate those theories of recovery that are based solely on a tort notion that the
employer has wrongly violated a state's public policy. Please note that the courts and
commentators in the field of employment law often use these terms to apply collectively to
causes of action based not only upon a public policy tort theory of recovery, but also upon
theories based on specific statutory enactments as well as theories based on contract law.
Again, this Note will use such terms only to represent the former theory of recovery.
6 Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988), and aff'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 131 (1992)
(granting employer's motion to dismiss complaint of plaintiff-house counsel who alleged he
was discharged for giving the company legal advice concerning compliance with various
federal and state environmental laws); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (11. 1991)
(denying in-house counsel's claim for retaliatory discharge where attorney alleged that he
was discharged when he objected to the shipment of tainted kidney dialysis equipment by
the corporation); Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (l.
App. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (111. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850
(1987) (denying former chief legal officer and vice-president in charge of the corporate
legal department the right to sue for retaliatory discharge where attorney alleged he was
terminated for refusing to remove or destroy sensitive internal company documents that
were subject to a discovery request in litigation brought by an insured against the
corporation); Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991), appeal denied, 478 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1991) (allowing an in-house attorney to
maintain a cause of action for breach of an employment contract to terminate for just cause,
which was established by the company's policy manual and pamphlets); Nordling v.
Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991) (holding that an in-house
attorney may maintain a breach of contract claim against his former employer based on the
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corporate attorneys to bring a discharge suit against their former employer and
client,7 the wrongful discharge theory of recovery had not, before General
Dynamics, been approved.8 Although some commentators have argued that
recovery for in-house attorneys should never be allowed solely on a wrongful
discharge theory, 9 this Note will assert that such a recovery should be allowed
and that, consequently, the General Dynamics decision is on solid footing. This
Note takes a realistic and practical look at the issue of wrongful discharge suits
brought by in-house attorneys and the problems that these suits can raise and
reaches the same equitable conclusion as that reached by the California
Supreme Court in General Dynamics.
contention that he was fired in violation of the procedures established by an employee
handbook); Parker v. M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989) (holding that an in-house attorney was entitled to maintain a retaliatory discharge
action under a whistleblower statute); Kaplan v. Heinfling, 526 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1988), appeal denied, 531 N.E.2d 658 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that an attorney who was
counsel to a corporation could not maintain a suit for fraud and tortious interference with
the attorney's contract with the corporation).
Although these suits are a relative rarity, there has been significant scholarly comment
on the issues raised in these cases. See, e.g., Elliott M. Abramson, Wzy Not Retaliatory
Discharge for Attorneys: A Polemic, 58 TENN. L. REV. 271 (1991); Alfred G. Feliu,
Discharge of Professional Employees: Protecting Against Disnissal for Acts Within a
Professional Code of Ethics, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149 (1979); Daniel S.
Reynolds, Wrongful Discharge of Employed Counsel, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 553 (1988);
Kenneth I. Wilbur, Wrongfid Discharge of Attorneys: A Cause of Action to Further
Professional Responsibility, 92 DICK. L. REV. 777 (1988); Note, A Remedy for the
Discharge of Professional Employees Who Refuse to Perform Unethical or Illegal Acts: A
Proposal in Aid of Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L. REv. 805 (1975); Note, In-House
Counsel's Right to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 389 (1992). The
purpose of this Note is not to summarize the material already covered in the scholarly
writings on this subject. This Note is an attempt to look specifically at the wrongful
discharge (public policy) theory of recovery in these cases and how this theory was applied
in General Dynamics. This Note will analyze the specific public policy aspect of the
arguments against extending this cause of action to corporate attorneys and attempt to refute
these concerns and justify an expansion of this theory of recovery by using a very realistic
and practical analysis of the public policy justifications of such an extension.
7 Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991),
appeal denied, 478 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1991); Nordling v. Northern States Power Co.,
478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991); Parker v. M & T Chems. Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1989).
8 General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 501 (Cal. 1994); Steven
S. Gensler, Wrongfid Discharge for In-House Attorneys? Holding the Line Against Lawyers'
Self-Interest, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 515, 518 (1992).
9 See Gensler, supra note 8.
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II. GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP. V. SUPERIOR COURT
A. The Facts
Andrew Rose10 was an attorney employed by General Dynamics
Corporation (hereinafter General Dynamics). 1 In 1978, at the age of twenty-
seven, Rose began working for General Dynamics as a contract administrator
at its Pomona plant and steadily progressed within the corporation, earning
repeated commendations and, after fourteen years, he was in line to become a
division vice-president and general counsel.' 2 Shortly before his termination
with the company, however, Rose was involved in several incidents that
allegedly displeased his supervisors. 13
First, Rose spearheaded an investigation into employee drug use at the
Pomona plant and uncovered widespread drug use among the General
Dynamics workforce; this discovery eventually led to the termination of more
than sixty General Dynamics employees. 14 The second incident involved the
"bugging" of the office of the chief of security.15 Rose protested the company's
failure to investigate this incident that, if true, would be a criminal offense and
a possible breach of national security (the incident involved a major defense
contractor). 16 The last incident involved Rose's advice to General Dynamics
officials that the company's salary policy with respect to the compensation paid
a certain class of employees might be in violation of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938,17 possibly exposing the corporation to millions of
dollars in backpay claims.18
On June 24, 1991, Rose was abruptly fired by General Dynamics, the
company claiming that he had been terminated because of a loss of its
10 The "facts" hereinafter discussed are only the "facts" as alleged by the plaintiff, Mr.
Andrew Rose, in his complaint as originally filed. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 490. The
only issue before the California Supreme Court was whether the plaintiff had stated a valid
claim for relief. Id. at 489. After holding that the plaintiff was entitled to go forward with
his claim, the court remanded the case for farther proceedings at which time a
determination of the "facts" will be made. Id. at 505.
11 Id. at 490.
12 M.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 490-91.
15 Id. at 491.
16 Id.
17 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988).
18 General Dynanics, 876 P.2d at 491.
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confidence in his ability to vigorously represent the corporation's interests.19
Rose subsequently filed a complaint against General Dynamics, relying on two
main theories of relief.20 First, he alleged that General Dynamics, by its
conduct and other assurances, had implicitly represented over the years that he
was subject to dismissal only for "good cause." 21 Second, the complaint
alleged that Rose was fired for his involvement in the above three incidents and
that his termination violated fundamental public policy.22 The company filed a
general demurrer, asserting that because Rose had been employed as an in-
house attorney, he was subject to discharge at any time "'for any reason or for
no reason.' ' 23 Consequently, the corporation asserted, Rose had failed to state
a claim for relief.24 The trial court overruled the demurrer and the Court of
Appeal denied General Dynamics' ensuing writ of mandate, ruling that the
complaint was sufficient, at least at the pleading stage, to survive a general
demurrer as to both theories for relief.25 The California Supreme Court then
granted review.26
B. The California Supreme Court's Decision and Reasoning
The main issue in this case was whether an attorney's status as "in-
house"27 counsel affected his right to pursue a claim for damages following an
allegedly wrongful termination of employment.28 In its opinion, the California
Supreme Court discussed the important characteristics of the role of in-house




22 Id. For a more detailed discussion of the theory behind this cause of action, see infra
notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
23 Id. at 491.
24 Id.
2 Id.
26 Id. at 489.
27 1 will use the term "in-house counsel/attorney" interchangeably with the term
"corporate counsel/attorney" throughout the remainder of this Note to describe attorneys
who are the full-time employees of a single, corporate client. The literature surrounding this
area of law has used a variety of terms to describe the corporate attorney including "inside"
or "house" counsel. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 6, at 554 n.4.
28 General Dynwdcs, 876 P.2d at 489.
29 Id. at 491. The court also noted the growth in the number of in-house counsel in
recent years. Id. One survey even indicates that more than ten percent of all attorneys in the
United States are employed in-house by corporations. Id. at n.2.
13071995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
court pointed out that, unlike the law firm partner, 30 the economic fate of in-
house attorneys is tied directly to a single employer "at whose sufferance they
serve." 31 Thus, the court correctly noted that "from an economic standpoint,
the dependence of in-house counsel is indistinguishable from that of other
corporate [employees] who also owe their livelihoods and career goals and
satisfaction to a single organizational employer." 32 Moreover, the court also
recognized the dissimilarity between the professional relationship of "inside"
corporate attorneys and "outside" attorneys to their respective clients.33 The
corporate attorney is not hired for a "one shot" undertaking, but instead often
takes on a larger advisory and compliance role.34 The court asserted that this
expansion in the scope of the corporate attorney's work, along with the close
professional identification with the corporate employer, can easily subject the
in-house attorney to unusual pressures to conform to organizational goals. 35
The heart of General Dynamics' defense was its total reliance on the
court's earlier decision in Fracasse v. Brent.36 The corporation asserted that
this case was dispositive of all issues raised by Rose in his complaint. 37 In
Fracasse, the California Supreme Court had concluded that "a client should
have both the power and the right at any time to discharge his attorney with or
without cause."38 While it reaffirmed its holding in Fracasse, the General
30 Of course not every attorney employed in the United States is employed as either
corporate counsel or a private practitioner. In today's legal environment, attorneys are
employed in a variety of settings. It is not the purpose of this Note to survey the different
possible opportunities available to attorneys or to compare the corporate counsel's position
to every possible legal position that may be available to an attorney. Instead, this Note,
where appropriate, will concentrate on the same comparison used by the California
Supreme Court, namely the comparison between corporate counsel and the private
practitioner.




35 Id. at 492.
36 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972). In Fracasse, an attorney had entered into a contingent fee
contract with a client to represent her in a personal injury lawsuit. Before any recovery had
been made on her behalf, the client decided to terminate the relationship. The attorney then
filed an action against the former client claiming that he had been discharged without cause
and in breach of the agreed upon contingency fee contract. The court affirmed the trial
court's dismissal in favor of the former client.
37 General Dynanics, 876 P.2d at 492.
38 Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 13. The court, however, also held that the client had to
compensate the former attorney for the value of any services previously provided in the
event of a subsequent recovery.
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Dynamics court noted that the absolute right relied upon as a defense could not
be read as broadly as the corporation wished; to do so could lead to
unconscionable results.3 9 Consequently, the court stated that "our language in
Fracasse should not be read as standing for more than its context and rationale
will reasonably support."40 As such, the court did not feel constrained by its
opinion in that earlier case. 41 It is against this backdrop, then, that the court
went on to evaluate the two theories of recovery set forth by Rose in his
original complaint.
1. The Implied-in-Fact Contract Claim
The court recognized the validity of the implied-in-fact contract claim as a
limitation on the employer's historical at-will power to terminate its
employees. 42 Because this case came to the court at the pleadings stage only,
however, General Dynamics had not challenged the factual accuracy of any
39 General Dynwnics, 876 P.2d at 494. In fact, the court states that "'general
expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those
expressions are used.'" Id. (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399
(1821)). Thus, the court demonstrated the possible unconscionable results of such a broad
reading of the right that was upheld in Fracasse by creating the following hypothetical:
Suppose an attorney in New York responds to a professional advertisement
seeking an assistant general counsel for a corporation headquartered in Los Angeles. A
series of negotiations ensues and the parties execute a written contract under which the
employer agrees to hire the attorney to perform legal work as a full time employee for
an agreed salary. Suppose further that the agreement provides that the attorney can only
be terminated for specified reasons. The newly hired lawyer-employee then sells his
house, moves family and goods across the country, buys a new home, enrolls his
children in local schools, and begins his new employment. Three months later, he is
summarily fired by the company for reasons that are not among those stipulated in the
employment contract. To insist in the face of such egregious circumstances that our
opinion in Fracasse... immunizes the employer by providing an "absolute" right to
discharge the employee with complete impunity, foreclosing suit on the contract terms,
would compel us to embrace an intuitively unjust, even outrageous, result on the basis
of a holding expressly shaped by the unique concerns confronting the contingent fee
personal injury client who has lost faith in counsel.
Id.
40 Id. (citation omitted).
41 Id. at 495.
42 Id. For a brief look at the history of the employment at-will doctrine and the fairly
recent limitations placed upon that doctrine, see infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
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allegations in Rose's original complaint. 43 Instead, General Dynamics' only
challenge to this theory of relief was that the holding in Fracasse applied
globally to immunize the corporation from any liability as a consequence of its
termination of Rose. 44 As already noted, the court did not feel constrained by
its holding in Fracasse.45 The court felt that the overriding distinction between
the Fracasse case and the case then before it lay in the allegations that Rose
was hired as a "career oriented" employee with an expectation of permanent
employment, provided, of course, that his performance was satisfactory.46
Thus, the court held that while General Dynamics did have the right to
discharge any member of its corporate legal staff in whom it had lost
confidence, that right did not mean that it could do so without honoring
antecedent contractual obligations. 47 "In short, implied-in-fact limitations being
a species of contract, no reason appears why an employer that elects to limit its
at-will freedom to terminate the employment relationship with in-house counsel
should not be held to the terms of its bargain." 48
43 Id. This statement holds true for both claims pursued by Rose (i.e., the implied-in-
fact contract claim and the wrongful discharge claim).
44Id.
45 See supra text accompanying note 41.
46 General Dynantics, 876 P.2d at 495. The court further illustrated the distinction
between Fracasse and Rose's case by noting that Rose was allegedly promised job security
and substantial retirement benefits, that he allegedly received regular outstanding
performance reviews, promotions, salary increases, and commendations throughout his
fourteen-year employment, and that the corporation abruptly discharged him without
adhering to its published discharge procedures. Id.
47 Id. at 496.
48 Id. The court found instructive the recent opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court
in which that court stated:
"The fact remains... that the in-house attorney is also a company employee, and we
see no reason to deny the job security aspects of the employer-employee relationship if
this can be done without violence to the integrity of the attorney-client relationship. For
matters of compensation, promotion, and tenure, inside counsel are ordinarily subject to
the same administrative personnel supervision as other company employees. These
personnel arrangements differ from the traditional scenario of the self-employed
attorney representing a client; and these differences are such, we think, that the
elements of client trust and attorney autonomy are less likely to be implicated in the
employer-employee aspect of the in-house counsel status."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d
498, 502 (Minn. 1991)).
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2. The Wrongful Discharge Claim
The court also recognized the validity of the wrongful discharge claim as
another limitation on the general employment at-will doctrine. In quoting from
one of its earlier opinions, the court stated that the theoretical "'reason for
labeling the discharge wrongfil in such cases is not based on the terms and
conditions of the contract, but rather arises out of a duty implied in law on the
part of the employer to conduct its affairs in compliance with public
policy .... "49 The court, in discussing the validity of the wrongful discharge
claim under California law, enumerated three requirements of such a claim.
First, there is a requirement that the public policy at issue be not only
"fundamental," but also clearly established in the Constitution and positive law
of the state. 50 The second requirement is that the policy subserved by the
employee's conduct, although established by positive law, must be truly a
public one.51 The third requirement, under California law, of a valid wrongful
discharge claim was well stated in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,52 which
explained that "decisions recognizing a tort action for discharge in violation of
public policy seek to protect the public, by protecting the employee who
refuses to commit a crime, who reports criminal activity to proper authorities,
or who discloses other illegal, unethical, or unsafe practices." 53
The court recognized that this foundational public policy rationale is
particularly important in the case of an attorney-employee who owes a dual
allegiance: the highest duty is to the welfare and interests of the client, limited
by a sometimes competing duty, namely the requirement that attorneys conduct
themselves within the scope of their professional ethical norms.54 In California,
the minimum ethical standards that an attorney must follow are those found
within the California Rules of Professional Conduct. The court noted that these
circumstances can place an attorney in a moral dilemma where the attorney
49 Id. at 497 (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 377 (Cal.
1988)).
50 Id.
51 Id. The public policy must be one "affeet[ing] a duty which inures to the benefit of
the public at large rather than to a particular employer or employee." Foley, 765 P.2d at
379.
52 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (holding that plaintiff had no cause of action for tortious
discharge in contravention of public policy because no substantial public policy was violated
by plaintiffs termination).
53 General Dynanics, 876 P.2d at 497 (quoting Foley, 765 P.2d at 380) (citations
omitted).
54 Id. at 497-98. For more information on attorney ethical norms, see infra notes 145-
57 and 163-82 and accompanying text.
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may have to choose between the interests of the client, and the interests
embodied in the ethical norms of his profession.55 The court correctly
concluded that this moral dilemma can affect all attorneys, not just corporate
attorneys. 56 The court also pointed out, however, that the unique economic and
professional situation of the in-house counsel can intensify the pressure brought
about by such a moral dilemma in a way that is not present for the "non-
corporate" attorney. 57 As a result, the court concluded that in many cases, in-
house counsel may have an even more powerful claim to judicial protection
than their "non-corporate" counterparts. 58
The California Supreme Court was not blind, however, to the substantial
counterargument against permitting the pursuit of a retaliatory discharge tort
claim by in-house counsel. This counterargument holds that the maintenance of
such suits should be denied because such suits pose too great a threat to the
attorney-client relationship. 59 The court discussed three recent cases that have
illustrated this rationale. 60 The courts that have declined to permit corporate
counsel to pursue wrongful discharge claims have rested their conclusions on
two distinct grounds. First, because the fiduciary qualities of the profession
55 Id. at 498.
56 Id.
57 Id. The unique situation of the in-house attorney includes all those distinguishing
factors that were previously discussed by the court. Thus, the in-house attorney may also be
forced not only to choose between the interests of the client and the interests of his
profession's ethical considerations, but also between continued employment and
unemployment.
58 Id.
59 Id. The leading case following this rationale is Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d
104 (M. 1991) (denying in-house counsel's claim for retaliatory discharge where attorney
alleged that he was discharged when he objected to the shipment of tainted kidney dialysis
equipment by the corporation).
60 Wily v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988), and aff'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 131 (1992)
(granting employer's motion to dismiss complaint of plaintiff-house counsel who alleged he
was discharged for giving the company legal advice concerning compliance with various
federal and state environmental laws); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991)
(denying in-house counsel's claim for retaliatory discharge where attorney alleged that he
was discharged when he objected to the shipment of tainted kidney dialysis equipment by
the corporation); Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (1ll.
App. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (Ill. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850
(1987) (denying former chief legal officer and vice-president in charge of the corporate
legal department the right to sue for retaliatory discharge where attorney alleged he was
terminated for refusing to remove or destroy sensitive internal company documents that




pervade the attorney-client relationship, it is essential to the proper functioning
of the attorney's role that the client be assured that all matters disclosed to
counsel in confidence will remain sacrosanct. 61 Second, a wrongful discharge
cause of action may be redundant. If attorneys are in situations that would
enable them to bring such a claim, it is quite likely that the attorneys would
already be under an ethical obligation to sever the professional relationship
with the erring client.6 2
The California Supreme Court eventually reached the conclusion that in-
house counsel may state a cause of action in tort for retaliatory discharge.63
The court reached its conclusion in part because of the ethical constraints
placed upon the in-house counsel.64 The court also rejected the emphasis by
some courts65 on the "remedy" of the in-house counsel's duty to withdraw.66
In General Dynamics, the court rejected this "remedy" as illusory, noting that
"courts do not require nonlawyer employees to quietly surrender their jobs
rather than 'go along' with an employer's unlawful demands." 67 The court,
however, did limit, in two ways, the scope of its conclusion that the in-house
61 General Dynwnics, 876 P.2d at 500. For further discussion of this rationale, see
infra notes 132-57 and accompanying text.
62 Id. For further discussion of this rationale, see infra notes 163-82 and
accompanying text.
63 Id. at 505.
64 Id. at 498. The court's rationale can be illustrated by its assertion that:
Granted the priest-like license to receive the most intimate and damning
disclosures of the client, granted the sanctity of the professional privilege, granted the
uniquely influential position attorneys occupy in our society, it is precisely because of
that role that attorneys should be accorded a retaliatory discharge remedy in those
instances in which mandatory ethical norms embodied in the Rules of Professional
Conduct collide with illegitimate demands of the employer and the attorney insists on
adhering to his or her clear professional duty. It is, after all, the office of the retaliatory
discharge tort to vindicate fundamental public policies by encouraging employees to act
in ways that advance them. By providing the employee with a remedy in tort damages
for resisting socially damaging organizational conduct, the courts mitigate the otherwise
considerable economic and cultural pressures on the individual employee to silently
conform.
Id. at 501 (emphasis omitted).
65 See cases cited supra note 6.
66 General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 502. For further discussion of this rationale, see
infra notes 163-82 and accompanying text.
67 Id. The court noted that "the retaliatory discharge tort claim is designed to
encourage and support precisely the opposite reaction." Id.
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attorney may state a cause of action for wrongful discharge. 68
First, the court drew a distinction between the cases in which the in-house
attorney was discharged for following a mandatory ethical obligation prescribed
by a professional rule or statute69 and the cases in which the in-house attorney
was discharged for conduct that was merely ethically permissible, but not
required by statute or ethical code.70 In cases of the second variety, before
allowing a wrongful discharge claim to go forward, a court must resolve two
important questions: (1) whether the employer's conduct is of a kind that would
give rise to a wrongful discharge claim by a nonattorney employee; and, (2)
whether some statute or ethical rule specifically permits the attorney to depart
from the usual requirement of confidentiality with respect to the client-
employer and engage in the "nonfiduciary" conduct for which he was
terminated. 71
The second limitation the court placed on the scope of a permissible
retaliatory discharge cause of action related to the concern expressed by other
courts72 for the integrity of the fiduciary aspects of the attorney-client
relationship. 73 This second limitation is actually threefold. First, the court felt
that the fiduciary values underlying the professional relationship of an attorney
and her client can be protected by limiting judicial access to claims grounded
explicitly in the ethical norms embodied in the Rules of Professional
Responsibility and statutes of like effect.74 Second, the court noted that the
contours of the statutory attorney-client privilege should continue to be
observed. 75 Last, the court stated that trial courts can and should implement an
array of ad hoc measures from their equitable arsenal76 designed to permit the
6 8 Id. at 503.
69 Id. at 502. For example, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (West 1989) provides
for a list of mandatory duties of an attorney, including counseling or maintaining such
actions, proceedings, or defenses only as appear to him or her "legal or just."7 0 General Dynwnics, 876 P.2d at 503.
71 Id.
72 E.g., Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991).
73 General Dynardcs, 876 P.2d at 504. The concern is that by allowing corporate
counsel to bring retaliatory discharge claims against their former employers and clients, the
confidentiality of the attorney-client privilege may be breached by the disclosure of
confidential material in the course of a trial. It is thought that this possible consequence of
allowing wrongful discharge suits by in-house counsel could have a chilling effect on the
confidential relationship between an attorney and her client.
74 Id. at 503.
75 Id. at 504. In California, the attorney-client privilege is defined by statute. CAL.
EviD. CODE §§ 950-962 (West 1989).
76 These ad hoc measures can include the use of sealing and protective orders, limited
admissibility of evidence, orders restricting the use of testimony in successive proceedings,
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attorney-plaintiff to attempt to make the necessary proof while at the same time
protecting from disclosure client confidences subject to the privilege.77
Consequently, the court ruled that the case should be remanded to the trial
court and that the plaintiff, Rose, be permitted to amend his complaint in
accordance with the views expressed by the court.78
III. THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DOCTRINE AND ITS RECENT DECLINE
Before any meaningful analysis of the California Supreme Court's opinion
in General Dynamics can be undertaken, it is important to take a brief look at
the history of the employment at-will doctrine and its decline in recent years. 79
The employment at-will doctrine is a distinctly American development that
is a clear departure from the English common law approach to employment
relationships.80 The general judge-made doctrine of employment at-will states
that either the employer or the employee may, at any time and for any reason
or no reason, terminate the employment relationship. 81 The American notion of
employment at-will first took a firm hold in the United States beginning in the
last part of the nineteenth century82 and is still a basic concept taught in all
first-year contracts courses. In recent years, however, the at-will rule has been
and in camera proceedings. General Dynawics, 876 P.2d at 504.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 505. Rose was allowed to amend his complaint because he had failed to allege
that the conduct that allegedly led to his discharge was required or supported by any
provision of the California Rules of Professional Conduct or any other relevant statute. Id.
79 It is not the purpose of this Note to go into any detail of the growth and decline of
the employment at-will doctrine. For the purposes of this Note, it is only important to
briefly lay the background and recent developments of the employment at-will doctrine. For
a more complete coverage of this subject, see ANDREW D. HILL, "WRONGFUL DISCHARGE"
AND THE DEROGATION OF THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE (1987).
80 See HILL, supra note 79, at 1. Under the English rule, an employment relationship
was presumed, unless otherwise agreed upon, to be an agreement for a yearly term of
employment with each party being required to give reasonable notice to the other if a
termination of the relationship was sought. Id. See also Beeston v. Collyer, 130 Eng. Rep.
786 (C.P. 1827); Baxter v. Nurse, 134 Eng. Rep. 1171 (C.P. 1844); RICHARD B. MORRIS,
GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 219 n.2 (Harper Torchbook 1965) (1946).
81 See MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 2 (practitioner's ed.
1988).
82 HILL, supra note 79, at 1. See also Debriar v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450 (1851);
Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870); Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24
Mich. 115 (1871); Payne v. Western & At]. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884), overruled by,
Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
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"riddled with exceptions and exemptions. " 83 This erosion of the at-will rule is
occurring at the hands of both legislatures 84 and courts. 85
For the purposes of this Note, probably the most important legislative
exception to the at-will rule is the enactment by states of statutes commonly
known as "Whistleblower Protection Acts."8 6 Generally, these statutes are
83 HiLL, supra note 79, at 14. See also infra notes 84-105 and accompanying text.
84 The legislative exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine have been created at
both the federal and state levels. Examples of federal legislation limiting the employer's
power of termination include: National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 9 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)
(providing, in part, that employees cannot be fired for involvement in union activities); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988) (declaring, in part, an
employer's discharge of any employee because of such individual's age an unlawful act);
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) (declaring, in part,
the discharge of an employee because of race, color, religion, sex, or marital status an
unlawful employment practice). Generally, such federal enactments deny the employer the
right to discharge an employee on the basis of sex, race, religion, age, and other
enumerated characteristics.
Examples of specific state legislation limiting the employer's power to terminate
include: the Illinois Human Rights Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 775, §§ 1-102 (Smith-Hurd
1991) (forbidding, in part, employers from discharging employees on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, age, sex, or marital status); the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights
Act, MicH. COMP. LAws § 37.2102 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (prohibiting, in part, employee
discharge on the basis of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, or marital status);
the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290 (McKinney 1982) (forbidding,
in part, an employer of four or more employees from discharging an employee because of
age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex, disability, or marital status). For a detailed
state-by-state analysis of the major statutory exceptions to the at-will doctrine, see LEX K.
LARSON & PHILIP BOROwsKY, UNUST DSMISSAL §§ 10.01-10.52 (1994).
85 See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985)
(en banc) (holding that an employer may not discharge an employee for "bad cause"-that
which violates public policy); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo.
1987) (en banc) (holding that an employment handbook can create enforceable rights under
ordinary contract principles or a theory of promissory estoppel); Greeley v. Miami Valley
Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 1990) (recognizing a cause of action
in tort for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy), overruled by Cage v. Gateways
to Better Living, Inc., No. 94 C.A. 44, 1995 WL 382170 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1995).
For a detailed state-by-state analysis of the major judicial exceptions to the at-will doctrine,
see LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 84, at §§ 10.01-10.52.
According to a recent survey, 43 of the 50 jurisdictions have adopted the so-called
"retaliatory discharge" or "wrongful discharge" cause of action as an exception to the
employer's historical at-will power of termination. See Note, In-House Counsel's Right to
Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, supra note 6, at 394.
86 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-51 (West 1983) (applying to private
employers and political subdivisions of the state); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-61 (West
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created in order to protect employees from being discharged in retaliation for
the employees' reporting of an illegal act perpetrated by the employer or
another employee.87 These statutes are usually premised on the notion that the
state's public policy is to encourage reporting of harmful or illegal acts and to
protect those employees who decide to come forward with such information. 88
As noted above, the courts have also taken a significant role in the
derogation of the employment at-will doctrine. 89 In fact, because the
employment at-will rule is a purely judge-made doctrine, many courts have felt
free to deviate from it as the circumstances dictate. 90 As one commentator has
noted, the courts are whittling away the general at-will rule in two significant
ways: "by finding implied contractual protections91 and by permitting
discharged employees to sue in tort where the dismissal violated the state's
public policy." 92 The distinction between the contract theory exceptions and
the public policy tort exception (hereinafter the "public policy" exception) to
the employment at-will doctrine is made by focusing on the duty that has been
allegedly breached: is it a duty mandated by a promise set forth in an explicit
Supp. 1994) (applying to state employees); McH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361-.369
(West 1981 & Supp. 1994) (applying to both private and state employees); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 30:2027 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (prohibiting any retaliatory action against an
employee who makes a good faith report of a violation of local, state, or federal
environmental law or regulation). The federal government and roughly three-fourths of the
states have enacted this type of legislation. LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 84, at § 5.03.
California has two whistleblower statutes. See infra note 87. The California Supreme
Court, however, did not consider this theory of recovery in General Dynwics. One
possible explanation of this may be that Mr. Rose did not state such a claim in his
complaint. Whatever the reason for this omission, these statutes are important in corporate
attorney discharge suits not only because these statutes offer a viable theory of recovery, but
because the statutes represent an explicit enunciation of the public policy considerations that
are put forth as grounds for the extension of the wrongful discharge cause of action to
corporate attorneys.
87 For example, California's general whistleblower statute provides in pertinent part:
"No employer shall retaliate against an employee for disclosing information to a
government or law enforcement agency, where the employee has reasonable cause to
believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or violation or
noncompliance with a state or federal regulation." CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102.5 (West
1989). California also has a whistleblower statute that applies specifically to public
employees. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8547 (West Supp. 1994).
88 LAPsoN & BORowsKY, supra note 84, at § 5.03.
89 See supra note 85.
90 Gensler, supra note 8, at 521.
91 These can include implied-in-fact employment contracts or more simply, implied
obligations of good faith. Gensler, supra note 8, at 516.
9 2 Id.
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or implied contract or is it a duty implied by law?93
A. Contract Theory Exceptions to the Employment At-Will Doctrine
Contract theory exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine have
encountered greater acceptance than the emerging public policy theory. 94 As
noted above, however, the main focus of this Note is to concentrate on the
public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine and how this
exception relates to the corporate attorney. Thus, it is only necessary to
mention that the court in General Dynamics did rely, in part, on an implied-in-
fact contract theory to reach its decision. In its reliance on this theory,
however, the California Supreme Court broke no new ground in this area of
the law and simply added its support to similar decisions reached by other
courts.
95
B. The Public Policy Exception to the Employment At-Will Doctrine
The first court to craft a public policy exception to the employment at-will
doctrine was the California District Court of Appeals in Petennann v.
93 See William L. Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer
Privilege, 21 IDAHo L. REV. 201, 209 (1985). This distinction is not always easily made by
the courts and many times the analysis performed by courts does not take into account this
distinction. Id. at 207.
The California Supreme Court, however, has not fallen prey to this "mixing of
theories." In Twneny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980), the court
distinguished between tort and contract theories, stating: "'[I]t [is] well established in this
state that if the cause of action arises from a breach of a promise set forth in the contract,
the action is ex contractu, but if it arises from a breach of duty growing out of the contract it
is ex delicto [in tort)]."'" Id. at 1334 (quoting Eads v. Marks, 249 P.2d 257, 260 (Cal.
1952) (quoting Peterson v. Sherman, 157 P.2d 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945))). Thus, it is not
surprising that the court in General Dynwnics made this same distinction and analyzed each
theoretical cause of action separately.
94 Mauk, supra note 93, at 214. But cf. Reynolds, supra note 6, at 557 (stating that the
tort mode of legal discourse has generally predominated).
95 Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991),
appeal denied, 478 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1991) (allowing an in-house attorney to maintain a
cause of action for breach of an employment contract to terminate for just cause, which was
established by the company's policy manual and pamphlets); Nordling v. Northern States
Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991) (holding that an in-house attorney may maintain
a breach of contract claim against his former employer based on the contention that he was
fired in violation of the procedures established by an employee handbook).
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International Brotherhood of Teamsters.96 The court in Petermann abrogated
the judicially created employer privilege because of what it believed was an
overriding public policy of upholding the integrity of the judicial process. 97
"Essentially, this growing body of case law describes a duty of employers not
to harm (e.g., fire) their employees who act in a way compelled by some public
policy or refrain from acting in a way forbidden by such a policy." 98 Thus, as
a matter of law, the wrongful discharge cause of action imposes a duty on the
employer from the outside. 99 It has been said that this theoretical exception to
the at-will rule is based upon "some external state policy that is deemed to
supersede the parties' agreement." 10o
The courts, however, have been more reluctant to recognize the public
policy exception to the traditional at-will rule. 101 This may be due in part to the
amorphous quality of a "public policy" standard. 102 Consequently, some courts
have been careful to limit the extension of the public policy exception to cases
where the overriding public policy is clear. 10 3 Other courts have even refused
96 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). The court found that the employer had
fired the plaintiff because he had refused to give false testimony favorable to his union at a
hearing. Id. at 26. The court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for wrongful
discharge because "in order to more fully effectuate the state's declared policy against
pejury, the civil law, too, must deny the employer his generally unlimited right to
discharge an employee whose employment is for an unspecified duration." Id. at 27.
As one commentator noted, California's public policy exception stood alone for many
years until the Indiana Supreme Court followed suit in Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co.,
297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973), a case in which Indiana recognized a claim for retaliatory
discharge where an employee was fired for exercising statutory rights created under the
Workman's Compensation Act. Gensler, supra note 8, at 521.
97 Id.
98 Reynolds, supra note 6, at 559.
99 HILL, supra note 79, at 25.
100 Id. at 26 (quoting ROBERT E. WILLIAMS & THOMs R. BAGBY, ALLis-CHALMERs
CORP. V. LuECx: THE IMPACr OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION ON WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE SuITs AND OTHER STATE COURT EMPLOYMENT LrGATION 19 (1986)). The
Illinois Supreme Court stated that "[tihe foundation of the tort of retaliatory discharge lies in
the protection of public policy ... ." Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d
876, 880 (1l. 1981), remanded, 489 N.E.2d 474 (M11. App. Ct. 1986).
101 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
102 Gensler, supra note 8, at 522. Several courts have explicitly recognized this
"shortcoming" of the public policy exception. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (stating that "'[tihe term 'public
policy' is inherently not subject to precise definition'"); Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co., 421 N.E.2d at 878 (stating that "the Achilles heel of the principle lies in the definition
of public policy.").
103 HILL, supra note 79, at 28.
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to create a public policy exception at all, asserting that the legislature is the
only proper entity to alter the at-will rule.104 It appears, however, that the
courts have all been in agreement on the scope of the public policy exception to
the at-will rule in at least one area: the discharged corporate attorney.1 05
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP. V. SUPERIOR COURT
Discharge cases involving corporate attorneys are a relative rarity. 106 Of
the few reported cases, only three courts, prior to General Dynamics, have
allowed corporate attorneys to successfully bring such a claim, and of these
three courts, not one has allowed the claim to go forward on a public policy
theory.' 0 7 Although the General Dynamics opinion can be viewed as
exceptional because it is one of the rare cases in which an in-house attorney
was allowed to bring a claim against his former employer and client, the
opinion's real contribution is its allowance of a public policy exception to the
at-will rule where a corporate attorney has been discharged. Not surprisingly
then, California has once again broken new ground in the area of employment
law. 108
While there has been substantial theoretical discussion of the possibility of
corporate counsel discharge suits in general, 10 9 "the truly intriguing case arises
when an in-house attorney is discharged in the absence of either statutory or
104 Gensler, supra note 8, at 522. See, e.g., International City Management Ass'n
Retirement Corp. v. Watkins, 726 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1989) (refusing to recognize a public
policy exception on such grounds); Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661
(Mo. 1988) (en banc) (same).
105 See infra text accompanying notes 107-14.
106 See cases cited supra note 6. See also Reynolds, supra note 6, at 563-64; Wilbur,
supra note 6, at 779-80.
107 Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)
(allowing an in-house attorney to maintain a cause of action for breach of an employment
contract to terminate for just cause, which was established by the company's policy manual
and pamphlets); Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991)
(holding that an in-house attorney may maintain a breach of contract claim against his
former employer based on the contention that he was fired in violation of the procedures
established by an employee handbook); Parker v. M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding that an in-house attorney was entitled to maintain a
retaliatory discharge action under a whistleblower statute).
108 See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959) (holding, for the first time, that a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine
should be allowed).
109 See sources cited supra note 6.
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contractual protection and for reasons relating to his duties as an attorney." 110
In this situation, the in-house attorney must rely purely on a public policy
exception to the at-will rule. In such a case, the in-house attorney must claim
that his discharge was in violation of a basic public policy of the state. This line
of argument, however, can lead to fundamental difficulties for in-house
attorneys because if the attorneys were terminated for activities that were
performed while they were acting in a legal capacity, public policy concerns
that are squarely antithetical to their claim can be directly implicated. These
competing public policy concerns involve the sanctity of the attorney-client
relationship and include the client's absolute right to sever the attorney-client
relationship u1 as well as the confidentiality of communications that take place
within this and in the furtherance of this relationship.1 12 As a result, a court
faced with a corporate attorney discharge suit is forced to balance and weigh
the effects of numerous competing public policy concerns.113 This difficult
task, then, is what makes these cases "truly intriguing" and has led some courts
to seemingly skirt such issues.11 4
A. Public Policy Concerns Weighing Against Extension of the Wrongful
Discharge Cause of Action to Corporate Attorneys
The courts have dealt with two main public policy concerns that weigh
against the extension of the wrongful discharge cause of action to corporate
attorneys. The first is the absolute right of a client to terminate the attorney-
client relationship at any time and for any reason. The second is the
confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship.
1. The Cient's Right to Sever the Attorney-CGient Relationship
The corporation in General Dynamics attempted to assert as a total defense
110 Gensler, supra note 8, at 529.
111 This was the absolute defense that the corporation attempted to invoke in General
Dynanics. General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 491 (Cal. 1994). For
further discussion of this topic, see infra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
112 This "confidentiality" can have two components. The first is the attorney-client
privilege and is controlled by rules of evidence. See infra notes 136-44 and accompanying
text. The second component is the attorney-client confidence and is governed by rules of
ethics. See infra notes 145-57 and accompanying text.
113 As Steven Gensler points out, the issue "is purely one of public policy." Gensler,
supra note 8, at 529.
114 See cases cited supra note 6.
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the client's absolute right to sever the attorney-client relationship. 115 This same
defense tactic has been successfully utilized in several in-house attorney
discharge suits in which courts have denied the attorney the right to bring a
cause of action against his former employer. 116 As stated by the Illinois
Supreme Court, this general rule "recognizes that the relationship between an
attorney and client is based on trust and that the client must have confidence in
his attorney in order to ensure that the relationship will function properly." 117
Implicit in this statement is the notion that "no client should be forced to suffer
representation by an attorney in whom [the client's] confidence... has been
lost."118
This general right of a client, however, does not mean that all clients may
unilaterally discharge their attorneys under any and all circumstances without
consequence. For example, at least one federal court has held that, because
discrimination against an employee based on race or sex is prohibited by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,119 such discrimination is also prohibited
against one employed as in-house counsel. 120 California also has limited the
client's discretion by holding that the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act121 creates an
exception to the general notion that a client may discharge an attorney at
will. 122 Even in Fracasse, the case relied upon by General Dynamics, 123 the
115 See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
116 See, e.g., Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 109 (111. 991) ("Generally, a
client may discharge his attorney at any time, with or without cause."); Herbster v. North
Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 347 (111. App. Ct. 1986), appeal denied,
508 N.E.2d 728 (l. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987) ("[Tihe general rule is that a
client may terminate the relationship between himself and his attorney with or without
cause.").
117 Rhoades v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 399 N.E.2d 969, 974 (111. 1979) (allowing
discharged law firm to recover on quantum meruit basis fees for reasonable services
performed for former client up to the time of termination). The California Supreme Court
has stated that it "should be sufficient that the client, for whatever reason, lost faith in the
attorney, to establish 'cause' for discharging him." Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 13 (Cal.
1972) (en banc).
118 General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 493 (Cal. 1994).
119 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) (declaring, in part, the discharge of an employee
because of race, color, religion, sex, or marital status an unlawful employment practice).
120 Golighfly-Howell v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 806 F. Supp. 921,
924 (D. Colo. 1992) (allowing an African-American female to bring a Title VII suit against
the union after she was discharged from her post as the union's in-house counsel).
121 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-3511 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (requiring public
agencies to refrain from making unilateral changes in employees' wages and working
conditions until the employer and employees have bargained to an impasse).
122 Santa ClaraCounty Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142, 1160 (Cal.) (en
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California Supreme Court recognized that, in the event of a recovery, the
dissatisfied client was required to compensate the discharged attorney for at
least the reasonable value of any services provided.124 Thus, the General
Dynamics court was squarely on point when it realized that if clients could
discharge their attorneys without consequence in all circumstances,
unconscionable results could easily be produced. 125 The California Supreme
Court was also correct when it held that the general right of a client to
terminate the attorney-client relationship could never be as broad as that urged
by General Dynamics. 126 Therefore, as the General Dynamics court noted, a
court dealing with an in-house attorney discharge suit should not feel
constrained by the client's defense of an absolute right to discontinue the
attorney-client relationship.1 27
The California Supreme Court also was correct in recognizing that Rose's
complaint did not even contest the right of General Dynamics to sever the
attorney-client relationship at any time and for any reason.1 28 Rose simply
asserted, and the court agreed, that under the circumstances alleged in the
complaint, there should be a cost paid for General Dynamics' actions. 129 By
allowing corporate counsel discharge suits, courts will not be infringing in any
way on the client's right to sever the attorney-client relationship. 130 As long as
reinstatement is not an available remedy, a court allowing such a suit will not
be forcing any client to suffer representation by an attorney in whom the client
bane), reh'g denied, 1994 Cal. LEXIS 2768 (Cal. 1994) (allowing an attorney employee
association to bring an action for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Meyers-Milias-
Brown Act).
123 See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
124 Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972) (allowing a personal-injury, contingent-
fee client to discharge her attorney, but holding that the client had to compensate the former
attorney for the value of any services previously provided in the event of a subsequent
recovery).
125 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
126 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
127 The California Supreme Court noted that it did not feel constrained by its earlier
holding that a client did possess such a right. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
128 General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 494-95 (Cal. 1994).
129 Id.
130 As previously noted, the right of a client to sever the attorney-client relationship
quite simply is just that, the right to end the professional relationship. The right
encompasses nothing more. For example, a client could not run up thousands of dollars in
legal bills, discharge his or her attorney a few minutes before a settlement of the case, and
then expect to walk away without paying a penny. No one could reasonably assert that any
client had such right. The only right that such a client possesses is the right to end the
professional relationship. This is the only right that courts have protected.
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has lost confidence. 131 The only claim of such a suit is that the client should
pay a price where the attorney has been discharged in violation of a
fundamental public policy. Accordingly, the blind recitation of this general
proposition of law is not a defensible reason to disallow corporate counsel
discharge suits and the courts that have previously done so have simply failed
to analyze carefully and logically each legal argument presented to them.
2. Confidentiality of the Attorney-Client Reladonship
The preservation of the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship is
the reason most cited by courts for denying a corporate attorney the right to
bring a claim against his or her former employer.132 As one noted legal
commentator asserted, "[n]othing lends more vitality to the client-lawyer
relationship than effective communications between lawyer and client." 133
Generally, the confidential aspect of the attorney-client relationship can, in fact,
be subdivided into two separate categories: (1) the attorney-client privilege;
and, (2) the ethical rules of attorney-client confidence. 134 Neither of these
sources, however, can provide a firm basis for an unassailable wall of silence
around an in-house lawyer in a dispute with a former employer and client. 135
a. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is actually a rule of evidence that protects the
exchanges between attorneys and their clients from disclosure at trial. 136 This
privilege does not exist, however, if it is waived by the client or if the involved
communication concerns a continuing or future fraud or crime. 137 As the
131 Courts should be careful not to overlook the importance of the fact that, in the type
of case discussed in this Note, the sole reason that the corporate client has lost confidence in
its attorney is because the attorney refused to be a party to some act that would either
violate the law or violate the attorney's professional code of conduct. By denying corporate
counsel the right to bring a discharge suit, a court would be in effect rewarding the crooked
client while at the same time punishing the conscientious in-house attorney. For a further
discussion of this point, see infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
132 See cases cited supra note 6.
133 CHARLnS WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHMCS § 4.5, at 163-64 (1986).
134 Id. § 6.1.1, at 242.
135 Reynolds, supra note 6, at 571.
136 WOLFRAM, supra note 133, § 6.1.1, at 242. Generally, the privilege applies to
confidential communications made between an attorney and his or her client that are made
in the course of seeking legal advice. Id. § 6.3.1, at 250-51.
137 The latter exception is commonly known as the crime or fraud exception and is
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United States Supreme Court has stated, the privilege exists to promote and
protect "full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients .... 138 Because the issue of waiver is not likely to be implicated in
corporate counsel discharge suits, the only relief such a fired in-house attorney
can have is to rely on the crime or fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege.
Several courts have held up the attorney-client privilege as a bar, at least in
part, to discharge suits by in-house attorneys. 139 These courts have generally
asserted that the allowance of such suits would chill attorney-client
communication thus defeating the goal of promoting "full and frank
communication" between attorneys and their clients. 140 The court in General
Dynamics, however, took a more realistic approach to this potential problem.
The court emphatically rejected any suggestion that the attorney-client privilege
should be diluted, 141 but noted, correctly, that many of these cases will likely
lie outside the statutory privilege.1 42 In fact, although never specifically
mentioned by the court, the California Evidence Code specifically states that
there is no privilege "if the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to
enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or fraud." 143 Thus,
while a suit by in-house counsel may involve the potential disclosure of
privileged information, such a case can be dealt with appropriately by the
courts144 and such suits should not be banned in toto because the attorney-client
privilege might be implicated. Courts relying on the attorney-client privilege as
a bar to these suits are simply taking the easy way out of what is admittedly a
difficult situation.
apparently universally accepted. Id. § 6.4.10, at 279. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S.
1, 15 (1933) (citing the crime or fraud exception as supporting an analogous exception in
the context of otherwise privileged juror conduct).
138 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
139 See, e.g., Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (111. 1991); Herbster v. North
Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 346-47 (111. App. Ct. 1986), appeal
denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (M. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987).
140 Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 110 (11. 1991).
141 General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 504 (Cal. 1994).
142 Id. The court stated that "[miatters involving the commission of a crime or a
fraud... are statutory and well-recognized exceptions to the attorney-client privilege." Id.
143 CAL. EVID. CODE § 956 (West 1989).
144 This was the view taken by the California Supreme Court. General Dynamics, 876
P.2d at 503-04. In the cases where a wrongful discharge claim cannot be proved without
impermissibly breaching the attorney-client privilege, the suit should be dismissed in the
interest of protecting the privilege. Id. Such action, however, will seldom, if ever, be
appropriate at the demurrer stage of litigation. Id. at 504.
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b. Ethical Rules of Attorney-Client Confidence
The professional codes of legal ethics impose on attorneys a fiduciary duty
to their clients1 45 and the professional rules of confidentiality are generally far
more encompassing than the evidentiary privilege. 146 For an in-house attorney
bringing a discharge suit against his or her former employer, the danger of
running afoul of the attorney-client privilege, as alluded to earlier, would only
be present if the case actually went to trial.147 The unauthorized disclosure of
client confidences, however, is a very real danger to any former in-house
attorney bringing such a suit because it is likely that the attorney will have to
disclose confidential information when drafting the complaint. 148 Thus, if in-
house attorneys wish to bring discharge suits without violating the ethical
attorney-client confidence, they must avail themselves of some exception to the
confidentiality rules.
Under most rules of professional conduct there are exceptions to the
general proscription against disclosure of confidential information. 149 These
exceptions are of two kinds: permissive disclosure exceptions' 50 and mandatory
disclosure exceptions. 151 For example, Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct permits disclosures "to the extent the lawyer reasonably
14 5 ROBERT H. ARONSON & DONALD T. WEcKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
254 (1991).
146 Reynolds, supra note 6, at 572. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-4 (1994) ("The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the
ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client."). Both the
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility and the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility generally proscribe disclosure by an attorney of all information about a
client. WOLFRAM, supra note 133, § 6.7, at 296.
147 By this I mean that any possible breaches of the attorney-client privilege would
only occur if the attorney, in a trial, were to attempt to offer evidence that was in fact
protected by the privilege.
148 See Gensler, supra note 8, at 539.
149 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6 (1994) (allowing,
inter alia, a lawyer to reveal confidential information to prevent a client from committing a
criminal act that is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm or to
establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer
and the client); OHIo CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1994)
(allowing a lawyer to reveal the intention of a client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime).
150 See, e.g., MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6 cmt. (1994).
151 See, e.g., ILL. RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (b) (1995) ("A lawyer
shall reveal information about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client
from committing an act that would result in death or serious bodily harm.").
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believes necessary... to establish a claim... on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client." 152 Despite these exceptions,
some courts have denied corporate counsel the right to bring any wrongful
discharge action because such actions would allegedly chill the confidential
nature of the attorney-client relationship. 153
In reality, corporate counsel wrongful discharge suits would not adversely
impair the confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship. The principle
argument against the recognition of such suits is that an employer would be less
candid regarding potentially questionable corporate conduct knowing that the
counsel could use this information in a wrongful discharge suit. 154 This
argument is flawed in two significant ways. First, in states that require an in-
house attorney (under the professional rules of conduct) to disclose a client's
planned criminal conduct, any possible "chilling" effect would not be any
greater than it is currently under these mandatory disclosure requirements. 155
The same would be true, to a large extent, in situations where the in-house
attorney would be permitted, and not compelled, to disclose the company's
plan to commit an illegal act. Secondly, this argument is flawed because it
presupposes that an employer would discharge the corporate counsel if the
attorney disagrees with the questionable conduct.' 56 This rather cynical view is
not realistic. Usually, corporations seek advice from in-house counsel in order
to avoid, not commit, illegal activities. Consequently, corporations that would
seek to gain a competitive advantage at any cost by engaging in illegal conduct
are not likely to heed in-house counsel's advice anyway, and it is these
corporations that are the most likely to terminate the in-house attorney for
upholding the law and ethics.' 57 As a result, if the confidential nature of the
152 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1994).
153 See, e.g., Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 347
(Il. App. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (I1. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850
(1987).
154 1Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 109 (M. 1991).
155 For example, if an in-house attorney were practicing in a state that requires
mandatory disclosure to prevent illegal conduct on the part of the client, the allowance of a
wrongful discharge suit would not impair the ideal behind attorney-client confidentiality of
full and frank disclosure because the corporation would already be aware that the attorney
would have to disclose any plan by the company to commit an illegal act. This same
argument also holds true in situations that require the in-house attorney to withdraw from
the representation of a client that insists on breaking the law or insists on the attorney
breaking a rule of professional conduct. See infra notes 171-82 and accompanying text.
156 Raymis H.C. Kim, In-House Counsel's Wrongfid Discharge Action Under the
Public Policy Exception and Retaliatory Discharge Doctrine, 67 WAsH. L. Rv. 893, 906
(1992).
157 Id. at 906-07.
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attorney-client relationship is to be impaired at all by allowing wrongful
discharge suits, it will only be impaired in the relationships in which the
corporate client wishes to perform some illegal or unethical activity. In these
cases, courts should not be worried about any possible adverse effects on
attorney-client confidentiality.
B. Public Policy Concerns Weighing in Favor of Extension of the
Wrongfl Discharge Cause of Action to Corporate Attorneys
Generally, the courts that have dealt with in-house attorney discharge cases
have failed to evaluate in any detail the public policy concerns that weigh in
favor of extending the wrongful discharge cause of action to the fired
attorneys. 158 These cases, however, do implicate at least two important public
policy considerations that are favorable to such an extension. The first such
consideration seems painfully obvious, yet for some reason the courts and
commentators have failed to give it much attention. This consideration is the
basic proscription against acts that have been defined as criminal by society.
The second consideration involves the public policy concerns expressed in the
various rules and codes of professional conduct that favor ethical behavior by
all attorneys.
158 See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988), and aff'd on other grounds, 503 U.S. 131
(1992) (granting employer's motion to dismiss complaint of plaintiff-house counsel who
alleged he was discharged for giving the company legal advice concerning compliance with
various federal and state environmental laws); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (11.
1991) (denying in-house counsel's claim for retaliatory discharge where attorney alleged
that he was discharged when he objected to the shipment of tainted kidney dialysis
equipment by the corporation); Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501
N.E.2d 343 (11. App. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (1. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 850 (1987) (denying former chief legal officer and vice-president in charge of the
corporate legal department the right to sue for retaliatory discharge where attorney alleged
he was terminated for refusing to remove or destroy sensitive internal company documents
that were subject to a discovery request in litigation brought by an insured against the
corporation); Kaplan v. Heinfling, 526 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), appeal
denied, 531 N.E.2d 658 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that an attorney who was counsel to a
corporation could not maintain a suit for fraud and tortious interference with the attorney's
contract with the corporation). Instead, these cases have mainly focused on the public policy




1. The Public Policy Concerns Embodied in the Criminal Law
Whatever theory one uses to justify the workings of the criminal justice
system, the general goal of our system is to prevent socially undesirable
conduct.159 The main purpose of criminal law is to prevent harm from
occurring in society and substantive criminal law is the primary prophylactic
used to effectuate this purpose. 160 When courts fail to grant a cause of action to
an in-house attorney who was fired for either refusing to break a criminal law
or for reporting a planned violation of such a law, the public policy
considerations that are the foundation of our criminal justice system are openly
frustrated. 161 For whatever reason, the courts and commentators, including the
court in General Dynamics, have failed to accord the proper weight to this
policy consideration. Courts must be careful in these cases not to lose site of
the "big picture."
By returning to the original hypothetical presented in Part I of this Note, it
is easy to see how a failure to allow the corporate attorney to bring a suit
against his or her former employer will frustrate the public policy behind our
criminal justice system. The fictional corporate attorney in this hypothetical has
uncovered a current or planned violation of the law and is consequently
terminated for attempting to report or halt such a violation. By allowing the
employer, in this situation, to discharge the attorney without impunity, a court
would be encouraging (or at least not discouraging) conduct that is socially
undesirable while, at the same time, discouraging conduct (by the attorney) that
is highly desirable under our chosen system of justice. Viewing the problem in
this light, it is difficult to imagine how such an inequitable result could be
reached. As Professor Joan Krauskopf put it, "[a] public policy mandated in
criminal law could not be secondary to a... policy of employer freedom to
terminate." 162
159 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AuSTiN W. Scorr, JR., CIuMINAL LAw (2d
ed. 1986).160 Id. § 1.2, at 6.
161 The Illinois Supreme Court, in allowing a fired employee to utilize the tort claim of
retaliatory discharge, stated that "[piublic policy favors the exposure of crime." Palmateer
v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (1M. 1981), remanded, 489 N.E.2d
474 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (quoting Joiner v. Benton Community Bank, 411 N.E.2d 229, 231
(MI. 1980)).
162 loan M. Krauskopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modern At
Will Rule, 51 UMKC L. REv. 189, 236 (1983).
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2. The Public Policy Concerns Embodied in Ethical Rules of Conduct
A second public policy consideration weighing in favor of granting in-
house counsel the right to sue for wrongful discharge is closely related to the
public policy choices encompassed in our criminal justice system. This second
consideration is the fundamental rule that "[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client
to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent." 163 Corporate attorneys, as officers of the court, occupy a place in
our society that a nonlawyer corporate employee does not. 164 Because of their
position in society and the highly fiduciary nature of the attorney-client
relationship, people place great trust and confidence in the legal profession. 165
In order to protect the public and to promote respect and confidence in the legal
profession, state bar associations have adopted rules of professional conduct. 166
At the most general level, the legal profession's rules of conduct mandate that
the in-house attorney 167 should maintain only the highest standards of
professional and ethical conduct and should act only in a manner that will
uphold and further this standard. 168 As a consequence, in-house attorneys are
required by their profession 169 to conduct themselves in a manner that the
163 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.2(d) (1994).
164 See, e.g., OHIO CODE OFPROFESsIONAL REsPoNsmLrrY EC 1-5 (1994) (stating that
"[b]ecause of his position in society, even minor violations of the law by a lawyer may tend
to lessen public confidence in the legal profession.").
165 "A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public
citien having special responsibility for the quality of justice." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr pmbl. (1994).
166 See, e.g., RULES OF PROFEsSIONAL CONDUCr OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
Rule 1-100 (1994) (stating that the rules have been adopted to "protect the public and
promote respect and confidence in the legal profession"); OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPoNsIBILrTY EC 1-4 (1994) (stating that the "integrity of the profession can be
maintained only if conduct of lawyers in violation of the Disciplinary Rules is brought to the
attention of proper officials").
167 The legal profession's rules of conduct apply, of course, to all licensed attorneys,
but the concentration on only in-house attorneys is necessitated by the purpose of this Note.
168 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1994) ("A lawyer
should strive to attain the highest level of legal skill, to improve the law and the legal
profession and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service."); OHIO CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSiBiLrrY EC 1-5 (1994) ("A lawyer should maintain high standards of
professional conduct .... He should be temperate and dignified, and he should refrain
from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct.").
169 For example, in Ohio, as in most states, attorneys, as a condition of admission to
practice law, must pledge "to observe and abide by the Code of Professional Responsibility
adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio." SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE GOvERNMENT OF
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nonlawyer corporate employee is not. 170
Several courts have dealt with this public policy consideration by noting
that these very same rules of professional conduct appear to decide the issue
against allowing wrongful discharge suits by fired in-house attorneys. 171 Most
states' rules of professional conduct either permit or compel an in-house
attorney to "withdraw from the representation of a client if . . . the
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or
other law." 172 Withdrawal has been the standard, reflexive response to the
question of how a lawyer should respond to a client's continuing or proposed
wrongdoing. 173 As a result, some courts have declined to extend the wrongful
discharge cause of action to corporate attorneys because, according to these
courts, doing so would be redundant: "[S]uch attorneys are under an ethical
obligation to sever their professional relationship with the erring client in any
event-meaning, in the case of in-house counsel, resigning their
employment." 174 Withdrawal, however, is not the question here; the question
is whether, once withdrawal has been effected (voluntarily or otherwise), does
the in-house attorney have any further remedy?175 I believe, while not directly
addressing this latter question, that the California Supreme Court did in fact
deal with the issues raised by such an inquiry.
The California Supreme Court recognized the emphasis that other courts17 6
THE BAR OF OHo Rule I, § 7 (1994). If attorneys fall below the minimum mandates of the
Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, they can be subject to disciplinary action,
including disbarment. See OHIo CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY Preface (1994).
170 This is not to suggest that nonlawyer corporate employees will not feel a moral
obligation to uphold the same level of standards that is required of attorneys. However,
there will usually not be any professional requirement (in the same sense as this term is
applied to attorneys) compelling the nonlawyer corporate employee to uphold this standard
of conduct.
171 See, e.g., Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (111. 1991); Herbster v. North
Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (IM. App. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 508
N.E.2d 728 (Ill. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987).
17 2 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1. 16(a)(1) (1994); see also RULES
OF PROFEsSIONAL CONDucr OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule 3-700 (1994) (making
withdrawal mandatory when, inter alia, continued employment will result in violation of the
rules and making withdrawal permissive when, inter alia, the client seeks to pursue an
illegal course of conduct or continued employment is likely to result in a violation of the
rules).
173 Reynolds, supra note 6, at 574.
174 General Dynamics v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 500 (Cal. 1994).
175 Reynolds, supra note 6, at 574.
176 See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988), and afid on other grounds, 503 U.S. 131
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have placed on the "remedy" of withdrawal, but stated that this "remedy" is
only "illusory." 177 The court explained that its lack of confidence in such a
"remedy" was twofold. First, the court noted that "[c]ourts do not require
nonlawyer employees to quietly surrender their jobs rather than 'go along' with
an employer's unlawful demands." 178 It is clear that this distinction between
corporate lawyers and nonlawyer employees leads to grossly inequitable
results, and as the court realized, the "wrongful discharge tort claim is
designed to encourage and support precisely the opposite" result. 179 The
second reason the court gave for its assertion that the withdrawal "remedy" is
illusory relates specifically to the status of the in-house attorney as a corporate
employee. Although some courts and commentators have denied the propriety
of drawing any distinction between the corporate attorney and the noncorporate
attorney, the reliance on this distinction is precisely what makes the California
Supreme Court's reasoning so persuasive. The court correctly noted that "the
withdrawal 'remedy' fails to seriously confront the very real and
extraordinarily high costs that resignation entails." 180 Corporate attorneys,
unlike their private practice colleagues, have only one client from whose
representation they can withdraw. In such a situation, in-house attorneys are
faced with two choices. On the one hand, they can choose to adhere to the
ethical norms of their profession and withdraw, forfeiting their only means of
income, or they can choose to surrender to their employer's unethical demands
thereby retaining their employment and salary. 181 Added to this economic
pressure is the institutional pressure, commonly present in corporate settings,
to be a "team player." While we would all like to believe the corporate
attorney, if faced with such a "choice" would "do the right thing," it is an
unfortunate fact of life that we do not live in such a fairy-tale world. We live in
a world where the pressures placed on human beings often compel even the
most ethical people to choose the path of least resistance, even when they know
it is not "the right thing" to do. Unlike other courts that have grappled with
(1992); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (I1. 1991); Herbster v. North Am. Co. for
Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (III. App. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728
(1Ml. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987).
177 General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 502.
178 Id.
179 Id. (emphasis omitted).
180 Id.
181 In addition to the immediate loss of compensation, the in-house attorney will also
be faced with the specter of attempting to secure new employment in an ever tightening
legal market. Furthermore, this daunting task will not be made any easier by the fact that it
will be very likely that the newly unemployed attorney will be hindered by the lack of a
"sparkling" recommendation from his or her previous employer.
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this issue, the California Supreme Court was realistic and recognized that
corporate attorneys are not characters in a fairy tale. 182 Consequently, the
withdrawal "remedy" as an answer to the public policy considerations
embodied in the rules of professional conduct is, in reality, grossly inadequate.
Today, courts faced with a case implicating such an important public policy
concern should follow California's lead and look beyond withdrawal as the
only answer.
V. CONCLUSION
Although most jurisdictions recognize the public policy exception to the
traditional employment at-will rule, until now, no court has seen fit to extend
this cause of action to in-house counsel.' 8 3 The majority of courts that have
dealt with these discharge suits have refused to extend, on any theory, a cause
of action to the discharged corporate counsel. 184 The decisions by these courts
generally have been grounded in a rigid and formalistic interpretation of
employment law, the evidentiary rules of privilege, and the various rules of
professional conduct. These courts have steadfastly refused to adequately
examine all of the public policy concerns implicated by these discharge suits
and have continued to view all attorneys in a light more appropriate for the
private practitioner of the nineteenth century. This narrow and myopic
approach adopted by these courts has led to grossly anachronistic results.
The California Supreme Court, on the other hand, has once again stepped
forward to take the lead in an area of law that, if given the choice, most courts
would choose to avoid. In a refreshingly modem opinion, the General
Dynamics court has openly and honestly addressed many of the "tough" issues
that the corporate attorney discharge suit presents. The court realized that the
traditional role of the attorney in our society has greatly changed and
consequently, as we approach the twenty-first century, the view of the attorney
182 As the court noted:
Oit is virtually certain that, without the prospect of limited judicial access, in-house
attorneys--especially those in mid-career who occupy senior positions--confronted with
the dilemma of choosing between adhering to professional ethical norms and
surrendering to the employer's unethical demands will almost always find silence the
better part of valor.
General Dynanics, 876 P.2d at 502. However cynical this view may be, I think it is the
correct view.
183 See cases cited supra note 6.
184 See cases cited supra note 6.
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applied by many courts is no longer appropriate. The General Dynamics
opinion is both functional and practical, recognizing that the ideals embodied in
the rules of professional conduct are just that, ideals. In the reality of the
corporate world, in-house attorneys are placed under extraordinary pressure to
conform to the desires of their employer and even the most upstanding and
ethical individual can fall victim to these pressures. The position taken by the
California Supreme Court may be criticized as being excessively cynical, but
the reality of the modern world requires courts to take such a view. In short,
everyone wants the in-house attorney to "do the right thing" and the overriding
aims of society's public policy choices are all slanted in this direction.
However, we all know that it is not always easy to "do the right thing" and by
denying the in-house attorney any right to a wrongful discharge claim, we will
only make the decision more difficult. There is nothing wrong with making
ethical conduct as easy as possible. Now in California, thanks to the court in
General Dynamics, the decision to "do the right thing" has been made much
easier for the in-house attorney.
